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THE STATUS OF INTERIM MEASURES OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AFTER
THE IRANIAN-HOSTAGE CRISIS
Peter Haver *
Unable to arrange direct negotiations with the Government of
Iran regarding the release of the American diplomats taken hostage
during the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran on Novem-
ber 4, 1979, the United States Government turned to a multitude of
international organizations to effect the release of the hostages.
The United States requested both the Security Council and the
General Assembly to take measures to free the American citizens in
Tehran and sought to persuade its North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO) allies to launch an economic boycott against Iran. In
addition to its appeals to various political organizations, the United
States took its cause to the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.).
In an unprecedented move, the Court issued an interim measure of
protection requiring Iran to surrender the American hostages.' Al-
though the order greatly pleased the United States Government,
adding legitimacy to its cause, most Americans had little faith in
the Court's power to enforce this order. Rather, they believed an
effective response would only come in the form of economic or mil-
itary force initiated by the United States. In light of the skepticism
shown toward interim measures of protection, this Comment will
closely examine their legal effect on parties and explore the en-
forcement mechanisms which exist to compel compliance. First,
consideration will be given to whether the interim orders are legally
binding or serve merely as recommendations. Second, this Com-
ment will study the Charter of the United Nations provisions for
enforcement of the Court's decisions, focusing on the effectiveness
of these measures and their applicability to interim orders. A final
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section will analyze the impact which the Iranian-Hostage case will
have on interim orders and the Court's power to adjudicate.
I. THE NATURE OF INTERIM MEASURES
Article 41 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
authorizes the Court to issue orders "to preserve the respective
rights of the parties pending the decision of the Court."2 Like the
preliminary injunction issued by domestic courts, the interim order
temporarily prohibits the disputed conduct until the Court can
render a final decision on the merits. In the absence of an interim
remedy, a party might irreparably interfere with the other party's
rights, thereby rendering moot the Court's final decision.' The
Court's power to render timely judgments often depends upon its
capacity to temporarily halt possibly abusive conduct.4 Diplomats
have long recognized the need for preserving the rights of States
prior to a final decision, and consequently, have routinely incorpo-
rated a mechanism for issuing interim orders into the procedure of
international tribunals.5
Interim measures differ both procedurally and substantively
from final proceedings on the merits. In addition to temporarily
preserving the rights of the parties, interim orders provide prompt
relief to the wronged party and give the parties a cooling-off period
before the proceedings on the merits begin.6 The advantages of
such a judicial tool are readily apparent when one notes the great
length of time which the Court takes in reaching a final decision on
the merits due to its complicated procedures.
The Court has gradually established requirements which must
2. 59 Stat. 1055, (1945). The complete text of the statute, which was annexed to the
Charter of the United Nations, is set forth at 59 Stat. 1055 (1945), T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter
referred to as Statute of the I.C.J.]. See note 20 infra, and accompanying text.
3. E. K. NANTWI, THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND
ARBITRAL AWARDS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 153 (1967).
A provision that the final judgment is binding becomes pointless if that deci-
sion can be negatived by actions of one of the parties in advance of the judgment.
It is to prevent such an impasse that the Court is given the power to indicate the
interim measures if the circumstances require, since, presumably, 'circumstances'
could never require if the final judgment would be of no effect.
4. Goldsworthy, Interim Measures of Protection in the International Court of Justice, 68
AM. J. INT'L L. 258 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Goldsworthy].
5. See Treaty for the Advancement of Peace of October 13, 1914, between Sweden and
the United States, relating to dispute settlement. 38 Stat. 1874 (the Bryan Treaties); Statute
of the Central American Court of Justice, [1908] AM. J. INT'L. L. Supp. 231 (1908).
6. Goldsworthy, supra note 4, at 258.
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be met before an interim order may be issued.7 A party to a suit
may request an interim order8 or the Court may "initiate measures
proprio motu."' Arguably, however, the party must submit the dis-
pute on the merits to the Court before requesting interim relief.'0
The Court may not grant interim relief where the dispute on the
merits is not before the Court." The issuance of an interim order
in no way affects the Court's final decision on the merits 12 and does
not have the force of res judicata.'3 The controversy before the
Court must presently affect the requesting party 14 and must
threaten to do permanent damage for which the injured party can-
not be compensated. 5 Furthermore, interim orders extend only to
that conduct which is central to the dispute before the Court. They
may not be directed at conduct which lies outside the boundaries of
the suit.' 6 The requesting party must have a special interest in the
7. For a detailed discussion of these requirements, see id, at 259.
8. Article 66(1) of the Rules of the I.C.J. provides: "A request for indication of interim
measures of protection may be filed at any time during the proceedings in the case in the
connection with which it is made."
9. Article 66(6) of the Rules of the ICJ.
10. The Court has stated, "it is in principle arguable that such a power [to grant interim
orders] on the part of the Court exists only in respect of a dispute already submitted to it."
Legal Status of the South-Eastern Territory of Greenland, [1932] P.C.I.J., Serv. A/B, No. 48,
at 283-84.
11. Goldsworthy, supra note 4, at 266.
12. Although the issuance of an interim order does not affect the final judgment on the
merits, the Court has considered proposed rules which would place a heavier burden of proof
on parties who violated an interim order. Infra, note 58 and accompanying text.
13. Article 66(7) of the Rules states that, "The Court may at any time by reason of
change in the situation revoke or modify its decision indicating interim measures of protec-
tion."
14. In the Case Concerning the Administration of the Prince von Pless, (Interim Meas-
ures of Protection) [1933] P.C.I.J., Serv. A/B, No. 54, 150, Germany brought suit against Po-
land for imposing taxes on German nationals in violation of certain treaties. Poland agreed
to refrain from taxing Prince von Pless until the Court rendered a judgment. In light of this
agreement, the Court found Germany's request for an interim measure "ceased to have any
object" since Germany was in no immediate danger of being taxed. See also the Interhandel
Case (Interim Measures of Protection), Order of October 24, 1957, 11957] I.C.J. 105.
15. In Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Interim Protection, Order of June 22, 1973,
[1973] I.C.J. 99, 105, the Court indicated an interim order which specifically prohibited
France from conducting further nuclear explosion tests in the vicinity of Australia on the
grounds that such tests might irreparably harm Australia by exposing the continent to radia-
tion. Another example of the Court requiring the possibility of irreparable harm is Fisheries
Jurisdiction (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), Interim
Protection, Order of 17 August 1972, [1972] I.C.J. 12.
16. See the Case Concerning the Polish Agrarian Reform and the German Minority,
[1933] P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 58. Here, Germany requested that the Court order a temporary
prohibition on all Polish Agrarian Reform, whereas the claim before the Court concerned
discrimination against Polish nations of German descent by Poland in applying its agrarian
reform. The Court found that the request exceeded the scope of the claim and denied the
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dispute in order to warrant the issuance of interim orders. In the
past, the Court has refused to grant interim measures where the
dispute affected only a general right which the requesting party
shared with other nations.'7
International law scholars have struggled with the question of
the Court's jurisdiction to impose interim orders. In a proceeding
on the merits, the Court determines whether it has final jurisdiction
over a matter. '8 However, in the case of interim orders, the urgency
of the situation requires the Court to issue an order before it has
time to render a decision as to final jurisdiction. Because of this
time factor, the Court has developed a shorthand test for determin-
ing its jurisdiction in regard to the issuance of interim orders.
Under this test, the Court is deemed to have jurisdiction, for pur-
poses of issuing interim orders, when the possibility exists that the
Court will have final jurisdiction.' 9
II. THE BINDING NATURE OF INTERIM ORDERS
Before exploring the potential for enforcing interim orders, it
is crucial to determine what legal effect they may have. Article 41
of the Statute of the I.C.J. granting interim relief states:
1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it consid-
ers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures
interim order. See also Goldsworthy, supra note 4, at 271. Nuclear Tests, supra note 15, at
99.
17. For example, in the Nuclear Tests Case, Australia requested an interim order
(prohibiting further French nuclear tests) on the grounds that nuclear tests threatened to
pollute the ocean and infringed on Australia's general right to freedom of the seas. Although
the Court granted an interim order in this case because of the possibility that radioactive
fallout might reach the territory of Australia, the Court rejected Australia's "freedom of the
Seas" argument on the grounds that Australia had no special interests in the endangered
international waters beyond those interests shared by other nations. Nuclear Tests supra
note 15, at 99. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, the Court granted interim orders to protect
Britain's right to fish international waters close to Iceland. At first glance, the Court appears
to have issued the interim order based upon Britain's general right to freedom of the high
seas. However, language in the decision indicates that the Court believed Britain to have a
special interest in these waters due to its economic dependence on the catch taken there.
Fisheries Jurisdiction supra note 15.
18. Article 36(6) states: "In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdic-
tion, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court."
19. For a discussion of the "possibility" rule, see Mendelson, Interim Measures of Pro-
tection in Cases of ContestedJurisdiction, 46 BIUT. Y.B. INT'L L. 259 (1972-73). Some schol-
ars have questioned the validity of the "possibility" rule. See Bernhardt, The Provisional
Measures Procedure of the International Court of Justice Through U.S Staff in Tehran: Flat
Iustitia, Percet Curia? 23 VA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. (1981).
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which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either
party.
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures sug-
gested shall forthwith be given to the parties and to the Security
Council.
Commentators and jurists have long argued over the meaning of
the words "indicate" and "suggested."'2' These writers generally
fall into two camps; those who view interim orders as mere sugges-
tions to the parties involved, and those who argue that they have a
legally binding effect. Perhaps the most famous and authoritative
statement of the nonbinding view was made by Dumbauld, who
wrote: "[T]he Statute confers on the Court a 'power' and not a
,mere faculty' to indicate measures, there is no question of a bind-
ing order."'" The non-binding group concedes the existence of a
general duty on the part of the parties before a tribunal to preserve
the status quo. However, in their opinion Article 41 merely autho-
rizes the Court to make non-binding suggestions as to how the par-
ties can preserve the status quo. They contend that since these
suggestions emanate from the supreme international tribunal, the
parties would be morally, although not legally, obligated to com-
ply.
22
Hudson best articulated the case for binding measures in the
following passage:
The power conferred on the Court by Article 41 is to "indi-
cate". . . measures which ought to be taken. The term indicate,
borrowed from treaties concluded by the United States with
20. The equally authoritative French version of Article 41 uses the language "a le
Pouvoir d indiquer" ("has the power to indicate") in place of the verbs indicate and suggest.
Although scholars disagree as to the strength of this phrase, even adherents to the "non-
binding" school concede that this language grants the Court greater power than is suggested
by the English phrase "shall indicate" which in French is translated as "indiquera."
21. E. DUMBAULD, INTERIM MEASURES OF PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRO-
VERSIES 168 (1932).
22. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the Court does not merely 'suggest' appropriate
measures. It would seem that the word 'indicate' expresses exactly the Court's func-
tion, which is topoint out what the parties must do in order to remain in harmony
with what the Court holds to be the law. [The] submission of a controversy to the
Court implies certain obligations, such as that of not destroying the subject matter
of the controversy or anticipating the judgment. Article 41 states what are the du-
ties of the parties. It is the task of the Court to indicate what it is necessary for the
parties to do in order to fulfill their obligations under international law; but the
parties remain free to observe such indication or not as they choose.
Id. at 169.
Some commentators in the "non-binding" school argue that the parties are under no
obligation, moral or legal, to comply with interim measures. B. CHENG, GENERAL PRINCI-
PLES OF LAW 273 (1953).
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China and France on September 15, 1914, and with Sweden on
October 13, 1914 possesses a diplomatic flavor, being designed to
avoid offense to 'the susceptibilities of States.' It may have been
due to a certain timidity of the draftsmen. Yet it is not less defi-
nite than the term order would have been, and it would seem to
have as much effect. The use of the term does not attenuate the
obligation of a party within whose power the matter lies to carry
out the measures 'which ought to be taken.' An indication by the
Court under Article 41 is equivalent to a delcaration of obliga-
tion contained in a judgment, and it ought to be regarded as car-
rying the same force and effect.
E3
Supporters of this binding view have developed several legal
theories which reinforce their interpretation. First, they contend
that the duty to preserve the status quo while before an interna-
tional tribunal is a general principle of international law. 24 Conse-
quently, the Court may enforce this duty without any statutory
authorization. Under this interpretation, Article 41 merely gives
"life and blood to a rule that already exists in principle. These
measures are only the practical application of an obligation that
already exists in virtue of general international law."2 5
Second, these commentators maintain that the Court has the
inherent power to issue binding interim measures.2 6 Under this in-
herent-power theory, States impliedly consent to interim orders
23. M. 0. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920-1942
425-26 (1943). Curiously enough, Hudson had taken a contrary position in an earlier vol-
ume, 1932, maintaining that the terms "indicate" and "suggest" meant that interim measures
lacked any binding force. Perhaps the Court's 1936 revision of its rules altered Hudson's
view as to these measures.
24. The Court in Electric Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, [1934] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No.
79, at 194, recognized this general principle requiring the preservation of the status quo. This
assertion that the duty to preserve the status quo is recognized as a principle of general law
has drawn criticism on the grounds that such a view renders Article 41 superfluous. If a duty
to preserve the status quo is a general principle of international law, then there is no need for
imposing such a duty on the Parties by means of interim orders. For a discussion of this
argument, see Crockett, The Effects of Interim Measures of Protection in the International
Court of Justice, 7 CALIF. W. INT'L L. J. 348, 366 (1977).
Some commentators have responded to this criticism, asserting that interim measures
would have a useful function despite the existence of a duty at law to preserve the status quo.
"[T]he order may establish continuing jurisdiction, relieving the applicant from the burden
of showing some independent basis of jurisdiction, a burden which would have to be met if
the applicant only contended that a general principle of law had been violated." Id. at 375.
25. Hambro, The Binding Character of Provisional Measures of Protection Indicated by
the International Court of Justice, in RECHTSFRAGEN DER INTERNATIONALEN ORGANIZA-
TIONS 151-171 (Frankfurt 1956); cited in Nantwi, supra note 3, at 153.
26. Hudson, supra note 23, at 426.
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when they submit to the Court's jurisdiction.27 Several judges have
recently defended this inherent-power theory.
28
Finally, some supporters of the binding theory argue that
States have agreed to adhere to these interim orders by becoming
members of the United Nations and agreeing to the terms of its
Charter. In these writers' opinion, Article 94(1) of the United
Nations' Charter makes interim orders binding upon its members.
29
This Article states that "[e]ach member of the United Nations un-
dertakes to comply with the decisions of the International Court of
Justice in any case to which it is a party." In further support of
their argument these writers point to Article 92(1) which makes the
Statute of the I.C.J. an integral part of the present Charter. They
insist that this Article, in conjunction with Article 41 of the Statute
of the I.C.J., makes interim measures binding on members of the
United Nations.30 The fact that in the past nations have obligated
themselves to obey interim orders by entering into agreements with
other nations lends credibility to this voluntary-binding theory. In-
terim-order agreements most commonly take the form of dispute-
settlement treaties wherein the signatories agree to submit to the
authority of an international tribunal and agree to obey its orders.3 '
The travaux preparatoires of Article 41 does not resolve the
question of the binding nature of interim orders. Rather, this his-
27. The judicial process which is entrusted to the Court includes as one of its fea-
tures, indeed as one of its essential features, this power to indicate provisional
measures which ought to be taken. If a State has accepted the general office of the
Court, if it has joined with other States in maintaining the Court, or if it is a party
to a treaty which provides for the Court's exercise of its functions, it has admitted
the powers which are included in the judicial process entrusted to the Court. It
would seem to follow that such a State is under an obligation to respect the Court's
indication of provisional measures; in other words, as a party before the Court such
a State has an obligation, to the extent that the matter lies within its power, to take
the measures indicated.
Id. at 426.
28. See the opinion by Judge Negendra Singh in the Nuclear Tests, supra note 15, at 99,
109; Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice's separate opinion in Case Concerning the Cameroons
(Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of December 2, 1963,
[1963] I.C.J. 97, 103. See also, J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS
132 (1954).
29. Nantwi, supra note 3, at 153. However, most authorities disagree with this reading
of Article 94(1); instead, they contend that this language makes only final decisions binding
on Charter members. Hambro, supra note 25, at 164.
30. Article 41, read in the context of Article 92, does not seem to leave much room
for doubt regarding the legal character of the obligation ensuing-at least as far as
Members of the United Nations who become parties to litigation before the Court
are concerned-from an order for interim measures made by the Court in pursu-
ance of one of the provisions of its Statutes, namely Article 41.
Nantwi, supra note 3, at 153.
31. See Article 19 of the Locarno Treaties of 1925, 54 L.N.T.S. 219, 225, 337, 351.
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tory demonstrates that the Statute's drafters disagreed on this mat-
ter. The drafters, in large part, took the language of Article 41 from
the so-called Bryan Treaties, a series of dispute settlement treaties
between the United States, China, France and Sweden.32 Some
judges criticized the use of such timid terms as "indicate" and "sug-
gested,"33 but the drafters adopted the language over their com-
plaints because it gave the Court flexibility in determining the effect
of its own measures3 4 and was less threatening to nation-members'
sense of sovereignty.35 In light of its diplomatic origins, some com-
mentators insist that the language should not be read literally.
Rather, they assert that the Court should take diplomatic custom
and the drafters' intentions into consideration when interpreting
this provision.36
The initial proposal submitted to the Advisory Committee of
Jurists regarding interim orders contained a provision for sanction-
ing parties who failed to comply.37 This desire to provide a mecha-
nism for sanctioning violators of interim orders demonstrates a
concern on the part of the committee members that these orders be
binding on the parties. Although the Committee on Procedure re-
jected these specific proposals for enforcement,38 they attested to
the binding nature of interim orders by adopting Rule 57, which
entitled the Court to place on record violations of these orders.3 9
With the amendment of the rules in 1931, the Court deleted this
32. P.C.I.J. ser. E, No. 7, of 293. See Manin, Interim Measures of Protection. Article 41
ofthe ICJ. Statute and Article 94 ofthe UN. Charter, 10 IND. J. INT'L. L. 359, 369 (1970).
33. Judges von Eysinga, Guerrero, and Rostworowski expressed regret that the power
of the Court had been so restricted. P.C.I.J., Ser. D, No. 2 (2d add.), at 184-5.
34. Crockett, supra note 24, at 355.
35. Hudson, supra note 23 at 425. See also, Ser. D, No. 2 (3d add.), at 282.
36. Hudson seems to imply that the language cannot be read literally when he wrote,
"[Tihe term indicate, borrowed from the [Bryan] treaties ... possesses a diplomatic flavor,
being designed to avoid offence to 'the susceptibility of states.'" Id. [footnote omitted]. See
also Manin, Interim Measures of Protection: Article 41 ofthe IC/ Statute andArticle 94 /the
UN Charter, 10 IND. J. INT'L L. 359, 365 (1970).
"The term 'indicate' was employed by the Advisory Committee of Jurists of 1920,
not because the Committee did not want to clothe the Court with a power of issuing
an order which would be binding upon the parties to a case, but because it wanted
to follow a diplomatic precedent".
37. Proposal by Mr. Raoul Fernandez of Brazil, P.C.I.J., Process-Verbaux of the Pro-
ceedings of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, June 16-July 24th, 1920; cited in Dumbauld,
supra note 14, at 144, n.4.
38. P.C.I.J., Ser. D, No. 2, 290. See also Dumbauld, supra note 21, at 146.
39. 57 of the Rules (1922). See Crockett, supra note 24, at 355. ("It is noteworthy that
an apparent compromise was reached, as evidenced by the inclusion of a provision in Article
57 of the Rules which allowed the Court to place in the record the fact that a party had failed
to comply with interim measures.")
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portion of Rule 57.40 Nevertheless, the Court's discussions during
the amendment proceedings indicated that the majority of the
judges considered interim orders to be binding.4'
In summary, neither the Statute of the I.C.J. nor the Court's
revisions of its rules have set forth the legal effect which interim
orders have on the parties. Despite the absence of a provision in
the Statute or the Rules of the Court which proclaims interim or-
ders to be binding on the parties, the judges have taken measures to
strengthen these provisional measures.
The rules which define the Court's jurisdiction in the case of
interim orders shed some light on the "binding nature" issue. Al-
though these jurisdictional rules do not speak directly to the issue
of the binding nature of these orders, the strictness with which ju-
risdiction is regulated does to some extent indicate the degree of
finality attached to such orders. The Court may place stricter juris-
dictional requirements on measures which have the effect of law,
whereas interim orders that are merely suggestions are less likely to
be restricted by rigidly defined jurisdictional requirements. Under
this analysis the Court's selection of the "possibility" rule,42 which
grants the Court jurisdiction where the possibility exists that the
dispute would come under the Court's final jurisdiction, suggests
that the Court views these orders as non-binding.43 Orders based
on such minimal jurisdictional requirements arguably should not
carry the weight of a final judgment. Other authorities have criti-
cized this analysis, contending that the "possibility" rule was insti-
tuted because of practical considerations and has no bearing on the
legal effect of such orders."
Article 41 of the Statute of the I.C.J., which authorizes the is-
suing of interim orders, is the primary statute dealing with these
legal measures. However, in attempts to resolve the "binding na-
ture" debate, commentators have turned to Article 59 of the Statute
of the I.C.J., which addresses the Court's power to bind the parties.
40. Dumbauld, supra note 21, at 147.
41. Manin, supra note 29, at 365, n.29.
42. For a discussion of the "possibility" rule see supra note 19.
43. For a discussion of this jurisdictional argument, see Crockett, supra note 24, at 357.
44. Even though, at first blush, the minimal jurisdiction requirements suggest that
little legal effect should be accorded interim measures of protection, it would ap-
pear that the "possibility rule" has not been formulated because of an attitude to-
ward the effect of interim measures. Rather, such a rule is necessitated by specific
procedural rules and attitudes relating to the functioning of a court in the unique
position of the International Court of Justice.
1d. at 359.
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The Article reads: "The decision of the Court has no binding force
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case."
At first glance, Rule 59 seems to require a final decision in order to
bind the parties.45 The Court's holding in the Free Zone Case sup-
ports this interpretation. In that case it was held:
[O]rders made by the Court, although as a general rule read in
open Court, due notice having been given to the Agents, have no
'binding' force (Article 59 of the Statute) or 'final' effect (Article
60 of the Statute) in deciding the dispute brought by the Parties
before the Court.4 6
It is unclear from this passage whether the Court meant that inter-
locutory orders could not bind the parties or whether it merely in-
tended to reiterate that interim orders had no resjudicata effect on
the Court. Clearly, under Article 59, final decisions bind the par-
ties, but that language does not necessarily exclude lesser measures
from having binding force.47
The last source of authority which commentators have relied
on in an attempt to resolve this dispute is case law. The Court has
"indicated" interim orders in numerous cases, however, since the
parties generally follow the orders of the Court, the issue of their
binding nature has seldom arisen.48 Although the Court has failed
to issue an opinion as to the legal effects of interim orders, a few of
its decisions shed some light on the Court's view of these protective
measures.
49
For example, in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case the Court held
that interim orders do not prohibit the parties from concluding
their own interim agreement which differs from the terms of the
Court's order.5" The Court's interim order prohibited Iceland from
seizing British fishing vessels in the disputed zone and set limits on
the British catch in those waters. Subsequent to the order, the par-
ties entered into negotiations concerning an interim agreement.
However, during these private negotiations, Britain moved to con-
tinue the Court's protective order. The Court refused to bind the
parties to the order, stating that:
45. Goldsworthy, supra note 4, at 274.
46. [1929] P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 22, at 5.
47. Crockett, supra note 24, at 377.
48. In only three cases has a party failed to comply with interim measures. The Nuclear
Tests Case, supra note 15; The Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, supra note 15, and Anglo-Iranian
Oil Co. Case, Order 5 July 1951, [1951] I.C.J. 89.
49. For a discussion of the cases in which interim measures were indicated, see Crock-
ett, supra note 24; Goldsworthy, supra note 4; Hudson, supra note 23, at 424.
50. [1972] I.C.J. REP. 12.
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[Pirovisional measures indicated by the Court and confirmed by
the present Order do not exclude an interim arrangement which
may be agreed upon by the Governments concerned, based on
catch-limitation figures different from that indicated as a maxi-
mum . . . and on related restrictions concerning areas closed to
fishing, number and type of vessels allowed and form of control
of the agreed provisions.
5'
In effect, the decision entitles the parties to modify interim or-
ders by reaching their own interim agreement. This feature, which
enables the parties to negotiate their own agreement, lends
credence to the "non-binding" argument. 2 It might be argued that
since the purpose of interim orders is to preserve the status quo, a
separate interim agreement by the parties satisfies the Court's or-
der. The purpose of interim measures is to prevent the parties from
rendering the final judgment moot, not to impose certain conditions
on the parties. The actual terms of the agreement are therefore less
important.53 Should the parties fail to reach an interim agreement
during the negotiations, the Court would most likely reactivate the
interim order.
In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, the parties raised the issue
of the binding nature of interim orders. However, neither the
Court nor the Security Council, who later heard this case, resolved
the issue.54 The dispute centered around Iran's intention to nation-
alize a British oil company. In an effort to block Iran's efforts to
seize British oil interests, Britain requested, and secured, an interim
order which temporarily prohibited Iran from nationalizing the
British oil company." However, the Iranian Government ignored
the interim order and the case went before the Security Council on
the issue of enforcement of the order.56 Before the Security Coun-
51. Id. at 303-04.
52. Crockett, supra note 24, at 371.
53. The terms of an interim order in no way have an effect on the final decision on the
merits. Dumbauld, supra note 21, at 168.
54. For a detailed discussion of the Anglo-Iranian Co. dispute, see A. W. FORD, THE
ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL DISPUTE OF 1951-1952 (1954).
55. [1951] I.C.J. REP. 89 (issuance of the interim order).
56. In arguing before the Security Council Britain argued that interim orders were bind-
ing on the parties.
Now, it is established that a final judgment of the Court is binding on the
parties; that, indeed, is expressly stated by Articles 59 and 60 of the Statute and
Article 94, paragraph 1, of the Charter. But, clearly, there would be no point in
making the final binding if one of the parties could frustrate that decision in ad-
vance by actions which would render the final judgment nugatory. It is, therefore, a
necessary consequence, we suggest, of the bindingness of the final decision that the
interim measures intended to preserve its efficacy should equally be binding.
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cil could take action on the interim order, the Court dismissed the
case on the grounds that it had no jurisdiction over the parties with
regard to the matter in question. 7
The evidence is not conclusive on the binding nature of in-
terim orders. Although the Court's Statute lacks language which
obligates parties to obey interim order, parts of the travaux
preparatoires and various statutory interpretations support the view
that interim orders bind the parties. Furthermore, the fact that the
Court's effectiveness depends on its ability to provide interim relief
seems to necessitate a finding that interim orders are binding on the
parties.
III. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF INTERIM MEASURES OF
PROTECTION
.4. Internal Enforcement Mechanisms Within the Court
Assuming that interim measures are binding, the next step is to
provide an enforcement mechanism to compel recalcitrant parties
to comply with interim orders. The drafters of the Statute of the
I.C.J. have possibly created internal enforcement mechanisms
which would enable the Court to sanction non-complying parties.
These mechanisms range from an increase in the burden of proof
6 U.N. SCOR (599th mtg.), 20 (1951).
Iran contended that interim orders served merely as a recommendation to the parties.
What are the provisional measures which the United Kingdom delegation
would have the Security Council call upon Iran to obey? They are not a final judg-
ment; in fact, they are not a judgment of any kind. Before a party to a case before
the International Court of Justice, to say nothing of a Member of the United Na-
tions that is not a party to the case, is obligated to comply with a decision of the
International Court of Justice, that decision must be both final and binding. That is
the clear meaning of Article 94 of the Charter.
If we look to Article 41 of the Statute of the Court, which confers on the latter
power to indicate provisional measures, it appears that these cannot be final since
Article 41 states that they are to be suggested "pending the final decision". It is
only to the final judgment, however, that the Statute (Article 59) attributes binding
force. It is only the final judgment which is a binding decision, and it is only with
respect to such binding decisions that Members of the United Nations have, by
Article 94 of the Charter, given undertakings of compliance-and then only in
cases to which they are parties.
The United Kingdom representative [559th meeting], indeed, argues that there
would be no point in making a final decision binding if one of the parties could
frustrate that decision in advance and so render the final judgment nugatory. This
is an argument de legeferenda rather than one declaratory of existing law. Indeed,
the language of Article 41 itself negatives the inference which the United Kingdom
representative would have the Security Council draw. That language is exhortative
and not obligatory. The provisional measures indicated by the Court would have
binding force only if the parties were found by an arbitration treaty expressly obli-
gating them to respect such measures.
6 U.N. SCOR (560th mtg.), 12 (1951).
57. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, (jurisdiction) Judgment of 22 July 1952, [19521 I.C.J. 3.
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for non-complying parties58 to the creation of a separate cause of
action for the violation of interim orders.5 9 The only force behind
these internal disciplinary actions is the prestige of the Court and
the effect its actions have on world opinion. These sanctions affect
non-complying parties only insofar as these parties are willing to
submit to them. Where a party has rejected the Court's authority,
as Iran recently did during the hostage crisis, these internal sanc-
tions will fail to compel compliance.
The drafters of the Statute of the P.C.I.J. considered inserting
enforcement provisions for interim measures into the Statute.60 For
the most part, these provisions imposed a greater burden of proof
on violators. The Committee on Procedure rejected these enforce-
ment provisions on the grounds that since "the Court has no power
to enforce decisions with regard to interim measures . . . preserv-
ing the respective rights of the parties, there was no need to pre-
scribe detailed regulations in regard to the method of indicating
such measures. ' 61 This decision stemmed from the realization that
the Court was not the appropriate body for enforcing interim or-
ders. The Court viewed its role as one of "indicating" the interim
orders and notifying the League's Council of its action.62 Enforcing
these orders came under the League's jurisdiction.63
58. Infra, note 60.
59. No party has brought an action for non-compliance of an interim order, and it is
unclear whether the Court would entertain such an action. Should such an action exist, the
question remains whether a party has an action for a violation of an interim order where the
Court later determines it lacks final jurisdiction. Under the United States federal courts'
rule, preliminary injunctions remain operative until which time the Court is found to lack
jurisdiction. Consequently, under this rule, a party would continue to have an action for
violation of an interim order where the issuing Court is later deemed to lack final jurisdic-
tion. Those who argue for the application of the United States federal rule in the case of the
I.C.J. point to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case for support. There the Judges wrote that
interim measures terminate upon the Court's determination that it lacks jurisdiction. Supra,
note 54, at 114. This statement suggests that the Court accepts the federal court's view. See
Crockett, supra note 24, at 378-79.
60. The original proposal by Faoul Fernandez to the Committee of Jurists in 1920 re-
garding interim measures contained penalties for violators. Supra note 34. In 1922, Judge
Nyholm proposed to the Committee on Procedure that: "In case of non-compliance (non-
execution) with the order, the Court shall attach due legal weight to the fact when deciding
the principal question in issue. Section 106, Ser. D, No. 2 at 377, stated in Dumbauld, supra
note 21, at 147.
61. P.C.I.J., Ser. D, No. 2, 302.
62. Manin, supra note 33, at 369.
63. The Court at this time believed that notification to the Council that interim meas-
ures had been violated would bring a response from the Council. See speeches by Judges
Negulesco and Urrutia, P.C.I.J., Ser. D, No. 2, (2nd add.), at 193, 195. See Manin, supra
note 32, at 369.
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B. United Nations' Enforcement of Interim Orders
The recognition that enforcement of interim orders and final
decisions fell outside the scope of the Courts' powers led many le-
gal scholars to the conclusion that enforcement should be carried
out by an international organization. The drafters of the Statute of
the P.C.I.J. avoided addressing the issue of enforcement, believing
that this task was best left to the League of Nations. The United
Nations later assumed the responsibility for enforcing the Court's
decisions.
Although the Covenant of the League of Nations and the
Charter of the United Nations authorized their executive bodies to
enforce the decisions of the Court, a controversy developed as to
whether these statutory provisions authorized the enforcement of
interim orders. Most authorities remain convinced that meaningful
enforcement of interim orders depends on whether the United Na-
tions Charter' authorizes the Security Council to enforce these pro-
tective orders. In the words of one commentator: "To reach the
opposite conclusion [that the U.N. may not enforce interim orders]
would be to limit seriously the effectiveness of the Court in its dis-
charge of the judicial powers entrusted to it."
64
A brief survey of the League's power to enforce interim orders
provides a useful background for studying the enforcement power
possessed by the United Nations. Article 13(4) of the Covenant of
the League of Nations required the Council to propose steps to be
taken to give effect to any award or decision rendered by an inter-
national tribunal.65 Since interim measures fall into the category of
orders, it is unclear whether they came under the scope of 13(4)
which applied to tribunal "awards or decisions." The language of
Article 13(4) appears to require that the League take an aggressive
role in enforcing the Court's decisions; however, the League some-
times chose to disregard this duty when it felt that enforcement
would incite international instability. Although the language of
Article 13(4) imposed a mandatory duty on the Council to act
proprio motu (on its own accord) in order to procure compliance
with a tribunal's decision,66 in practice the Council used its discre-
64. Ford, supra note 54, at 93.
65. Article 13(4) states:
The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in good faith any award
or decision that may be rendered. . . . In the event of any failure to carry out such
an award or decision, the Council shall propose what steps would be taken to give
effect thereto.
66. Oeller-Frahm, Zur Vollstreckung des Enischeidenungen internationales Gerichis in
Vol. I I
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tion in enforcing these decisions.67 The Council never actedproprio
motu in an enforcement action under 13(4),68 instead, in both cases
brought under 13(4), the parties instigated the action.69
Article 94(2) of the U.N. Charter is the dispositive clause re-
garding enforcement of the Court's judgments by the United
Nations. It states:
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incum-
bent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other
party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it
deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon meas-
ures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.7 °
The inclusion of interim orders under Article 94(2) depends on
whether such measures come under the definition of "judgments."
Neither the Court nor the Security Council have rendered an opin-
ion as to the status of interim orders under Article 94(2).
The Security Council did entertain debate on the subject in the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, in which the British representa-
tive insisted that interim measures must be enforced by the United
Nations under Article 94(2) in order to give effect to the Court's
final decisions. 71 Although the Council never officially decided this
Volkerrecht, 36 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKER-
RECHT 654, 663 (1976).
67. W. M. REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION 704 (1971). In the Optants case, the Se-
curity Council reneged on its duty to enforce the Court's decisions. For a comprehensive
discussion of this case, see id., at 686-98.
68. Id. at 702-03.
69. Rhodopian Forests Case, League of Nations Off. J. at 1432-38, 1477 (1934); Optants
Case, supra note 68.
70. Article 94(2) limits enforcement to I.C.J. judgments, whereas 13(2) of the League of
Nations' Covenant authorized enforcement of every decision by the international tribunal.
Schachter, Enforcement ofinternational Decisions, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. i, 18 (1960).
Drafters of the Charter in San Francisco did entertain proposals for extending the scope
of 94(2), but there is no discussion as to why these proposals were rejected.
71. It may, of course, be argued . . . that Article 94 paragraph 2 of the Charter
only applies to final judgments of the Court, and, consequently, not to the decisions
of interim measures-just as the Iranian Government seeks to argue that the in-
terim measures indicated by the Court are not binding on the parties and that the
Court had no jurisdiction to decree them. I can only point out that the whole object
of interim measures-as, indeed, Article 41 of the Statute clearly indicates-is to
preserve the respective rights of the parties pending the final decision; in other
words, to prevent a situation from being created in which the final decision would
be rendered inoperative or impossible of execution because of some step taken by
one of the parties in the meantime with the object of frustrating that decision. Now
it is clearly established that a final judgment of the Court is binding on the parties;
... . But, clearly, there would be no point in making the final judgment binding if
one of the parties could frustrate that decision in advance by actions which would
render the final judgment nugatory. It is, therefore, a necessary consequence...
of the bindingness of the final decision that the interim measures intended to pre-
serve its efficacy should equally be binding.
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enforceability issue, most scholars agree that the "general opinion
(within the Security Council) was that the Security Council could
only take measures under Article 94(2) in matters relating to final
judgments. "72 In this particular case, the Security Council may
have felt particularly unsympathetic toward this interim order be-
cause it questioned whether the Court had jurisdiction in the case
at all.73 Perhaps, had the Court clearly possessed jurisdiction, the
Council would have been more willing to categorize interim orders
as final judgments for purposes of Article 94(2).
C. The Scope of the Security Council's Power Under Article
94(2)
1. Discretionary Enforcement Under Article 94(2). Assuming
that interim orders come within the scope of Article 94(2), the next
area of inquiry is the nature and scope of power granted to the
Security Council under Article 94(2). The U.N. provision differs
from Article 13(4) of the Covenant of the League of Nations in that
the Security Council, the United Nations' executive body, had dis-
cretion in enforcing the Court's judgments.7 4 This discretionary as-
pect of Article 94(2) has been criticized on the grounds that judicial
decisions should receive equal treatment, rather than selective en-
forcement according to political considerations.75 During the draft-
ing process the Cuban delegation submitted a proposal to impose a
mandatory duty on the Council to enforce the Court's decisions.
6 UN. SCOR (559th mtg.), 20 (1951). For a discussion of this argument, see Nantwi, supra
note 3, at 153.
The Iranian representative argued for a literal interpretation of the Article, contending
that the language authorized the Council to enforce only final judgments by the Court.
Before a party to a case before the International Court of Justice, to say noth-
ing of a Member of the United Nations that is not a party to the case, is obligated to
comply with a decision of the International Court of Justice, that decision must be
both final and binding. That is the clear meaning of Article 94 of the Charter.
Supra, note 53.
72. Nantwi, supra note 3, at 151.
73. It is likely that the indecision of the Council was attributable to the doubts
which several Members had regarding the competence of the Court on the merits of
the case. In another situation, it may well be that the Members of the Council
would consider that they had adequate authority to decide on measures to enforce
an interlocutory order, particularly where the preservation of the res was consid-
ered to be essential to the primary objective of the judicial proceeding.
Schachter, supra note 70, at 24.
74. Article 94(2) states: "[Tihe other party may have recourse to the Security Council,
which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations. See Schachter, supra note
70, at 18.
75. Oellers-Frahm, supra note 66, at 663.
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The majority of nations rejected the proposal. 6 Opponents of the
proposal made several arguments against a mandatory duty.77 But,
the real reason for the opposition appears to have been a mistrust of
mandatory adjudication, especially on the part of the superpow-
ers.78 The discretionary clause eased this apprehension by provid-
ing a loophole through which nations could escape mandatory
adjudication and compliance. Although the Council's discretion to
enforce may weaken the Court somewhat, this discretion does not
necessarily detract from international adjudication. 79 On the con-
trary, the enforcement of international decisions requires careful
evaluation of political interests and the accommodation of national
concerns."0 As pointed out above, even the Council of the League,
which in theory had a mandatory duty to enforce the Court's deci-
sions, exercised discretion in enforcing the Court's judgments.8'
2. The Relationshi Between Articles 39 and 94(2). An appre-
ciation for the ways in which other provisions in the United
Nations' Charter limit the powers granted under Article 94(2) is
central to an understanding of the Security Council's power to en-
force interim orders. A dispute has arisen as to whether the Coun-
cil's authority to act under Article 94(2) depends upon its power
under Article 39, which requires a threat to world peace. Some au-
thorities contend that the Security Council may act under Article
94(2) only when the situation meets the prerequisites of Article
39.82 Others insist that this power is independent of other Charter
provisions, and, consequently, the Council's competence does not
require a threat to world peace.8 3 Conditioning the use of Article
76. At the time of the proposal, the only provision of the proposed charter authorizing
the Security Council to enforce the Court's judgments was Article 39; but this article applied
only when the non-compliance threatened world peace. The Cuban delegation wished "to
create a more general means of enforcement of decisions." See Reisman, supra note 67, at
705. Article 94(2) served as a compromise, giving the Security Council authority, independ-
ent of Article 39, to enforce judgments, but this power would be discretionary.
77. It was suggested that the Security Council already had the power to enforce the
Court's decisions under Article 39, and consequently, the proposal was superfluous. 3
U.N.C.I.O. 461. See Reisman, supra note 67, at 706.
78. Reisman, supra note 67, at 712.
79. Id. at 711. See S. ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 104 (1975).
80. See supra note 55. See also Manin, supra note 32, at 369.
81. See supra note 66, 67 and accompanying text.
82. Rosenne, supra note 79, at 103-05.
83. See Schachter, supra note 70, at 19; Ross, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
102-03 (1950); BENTWICK AND MARTIN, A COMMENTARY ON THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 167-168 (1950); Sloan, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in InternationalAgencies, 3
ARB. J. 145 (1948).
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94(2) on the fulfillment of the prerequisites under Article 39 would
severely limit the Council's ability to enforce interim orders and
reduce the possibility of effective international arbitration.
84
Article 94(2) was drafted and implemented in an attempt to
create a "respect for the judgments of the Court."8 " This suggests
that supporters of Article 94(2) intended to give the Security Coun-
cil an independent power to enforce the Court's judgments, a power
not contingent upon other provisions in the Charter. In fact, at the
time of adoption of Article 94(2), many member-states expressed
their belief that this Article was independent of Article 39. The
Soviet member of the Co-ordinating Committee, Golunsky, articu-
lated this view:
Mr. Golunsky pointed out that the second paragraph of this
Article made a considerable change in the functions of the Se-
curity Council. Formerly, the Security Council had jurisdiction
only in matters concerned with the maintenance of peace and
security. This Article would give the Council authority to deal
with matters which might have nothing to do with security.
8 6
None of the delegates objected strongly to this interpretation. Only
China's delegate rejected Golunsky's conclusion as to the indepen-
dence of Article 94(2).7 However, because China's delegate
viewed every act of non-compliance as a threat to world peace, he
believed the Council had the power under Article 39 to enforce
every judgment of the Court. 8
Pasvolsky, the American delegate on the Co-ordinating Com-
mittee cast doubt on this initial interpretation when he testified
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations during the
Charter of the United Nations ratification hearings. He stated that
the Council's competence under Article 94(2) depended on whether
84. Reisman, supra note 67, at 711. Another negative aspect of this interpretation is that
a requesting party may feel compelled to escalate the dispute in order to qualify for interven-
tion by the Council under Chapter VI. Schachter, supra note 70, at 20.
85. Committee IV/I of the San Francisco Conference stated: "In support of the propo-
sal [94(2)] it was argued that the principle of respect for judgments of the Court was of
highest importance to the new international order and ought to be expressly implemented by
the Charter .. " 13 U.N.C.I.O. 298.
86. 17 U.N.C.I.O. 97. For a restatement of the Soviet's views, see Korovin, The Second
World War and International Law, 40 AM. J. INT'L. L. 742 (1946). It is interesting to note
that the American delegate, Pasvolsky, misinterpreted the Soviet delegate to be saying that
the powers under 94(2) and Chapter VI were closely related and perhaps repetitive.
87. 17 U.N.C.I.O. 98.
88. Reisman, supra note 67, at 708.
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89the incident triggered Article 39 by threatening world peace. One
rationale for this statement is that Pasvolsky wanted to portray the
Charter in a favorable light.9" Realizing the Senate's dislike of un-
qualified arbitration agreements, perhaps he thought it best to play
down any provisions in the Charter which strengthened the Court's
power. On the other hand, the United States officials may have
truly feared the Court's independent power and wanted to curb its
influence by limiting the situations in which its decisions could be
enforced by the United Nations.9'
The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case indirectly raised the issue
of the Council's competence under Article 94(2), but this dispute
was not addressed by the Council when it considered this case. Be-
lieving Article 94(2) to be an independent provision, Britain con-
tended that the Security Council could intervene on the basis of this
Article or Article 39.92 Britain, however, formally based its request
solely on Article 39.93 The fact that the Council in this case focused
on the issue of a threat to world peace implies that they viewed
their competence under Article 94(2) as being dependent on the
triggering Article 39.94 Although this case suggests an interrelation-
ship between these two articles, it is possible the Council never con-
sidered the issue of independent jurisdiction under Article 94(2)
because Britain never formally raised the question.
Should the use of Article 94(2) be conditioned on the trigger-
ing of Article 39, the Council could nullify the effect of tying these
Articles together by finding that non-compliance with the Court's
decision as eo ipso a threat to international peace.95 However, in
89. The Council may proceed, I suppose, to call upon the country concerned to
carry out the judgment, but only if the peace of the world is threatened, and if the
Council has made a determination to that effect. It is the party, not the Court, that
goes to the Council. If it is the aggrieved party, the party which is willing to abide
by the determination of the Court when the other party is not willing so to abide.
The Council simply handles a political situation which arises out of the fact that the
judgment of the Court is not being carried out by one of the parties.
Hearings Before the Senate Committee, Foreign Relations on the Charter of the United Na-
tions, July 9-13, 1945, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (rev.) at 287 (1945).
90. Reisman, supra note 67, at 712-13.
91. Id. at 7 10. "[llt is clear, however, that in 1945 the controlling elite among the fram-
ers wanted to render the tardily proposed enforcement machinery relatively benign."
92. The British diplomat stated: "In these circumstances, and quite apart from the deci-
sion of the Court on interim measures, which would alone, we think, justify the Council in
taking up this matter, there is a dispute, in our opinion, which should now receive the Coun-
cil's urgent consideration." 6 U.N. SCOR (559th mtg.), 4 (1951).
93. Id.
94. Finding no threat to peace, China suggested that the Council lacked jurisdiction.
6 U.N. SCOR.
95. The Chinese delegate to the Co-ordinating Committee took this position. See supra
1981
19
Haver: The Status of Interim Measures of the International Court of Just
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1981
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
the past the Security Council has insisted on satisfying the "threat
to peace" prerequisite before taking action under Article 39. The
Council's unwillingness to expand its authority under Article 39 by
eliminating the "threat to world peace" requirement, 96 stems from
member-nation's refusal to submit the handling of disputes to inter-
national organizations. Consequently, should Article 94(2) be tied
to Article 39, the Security Council, in all likelihood, would not take
measures to expand the scope of its authority under Article 94(2) by
circumventing the "threat to peace" requirement. Given the im-
portance placed on national sovereignty, the Security Council will
avoid enforcing the Court's orders unless the Charter clearly autho-
rizes such action and the majority of United Nations members
openly support enforcement.
D. Types of Coercive Devises A vailable for Enforcing Interim
Orders
1. A Discussion of the Various Devises. Although a compre-
hensive study of the various types of enforcement measures falls
beyond the scope of this Comment, accurately gauging the Coun-
cil's ability to enforce interim measures of protection requires an
understanding of the various measures and the advantages and lim-
itations of each. In considering the different measures of enforce-
ment, it is important to keep in mind that interim measures of
protection serve a different function from that of a final judgment.
Consequently, they may require a different mode of enforcement
than that used in the case of final decisions.97 Since there is gener-
ally a sense of urgency in cases involving interim orders, the en-
forcement measure must take effect quickly. Otherwise, the rights
will have been violated in the interim.98 In addition, interim meas-
note 87 and accompanying text. This interpretation produces a slightly different result than
would a finding of independent competence. Under Article 39 the Council need not enforce
the Court's decision; rather, it could make certain recommendations to the parties different
than those contained in the Court's judgment and then enforce its own recommendations,
not the judgment of the Court. H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 542 (1950).
96. See L. GOODRICH & E. HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 266-68
(1949); Reisman, supra note 67, at 711.
97. Interim measures of protection preserve the status quo during adjudication, whereas
a final judgment resolves the dispute.
98. The Anglo-Iranian case illustrates the need for quick enforcement. During the
hearings before the Security Council, Britain was forced to abandon its original request for
enforcement of the interim measure, because Iran had already begun to nationalize the Brit-
ish Oil Company. Instead, Britain was compelled to seek a lesser degree of protection than
indicated in the original order. 6 U.N. SCOR, (560th mtg.) 2 (1951).
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ures of protection are issued in situations where the dispute in-
volves irreplaceable rights. In most of these cases neither party is
ready to acceed to another form of compensation.99 These situa-
tions may therefore require a greater use of coercion to compel
compliance.
The Security Council has at its disposal many of the same
measures of enforcement available to individual parties.' ° How-
ever, due to the Council's prestige and influence, these measures
have greater impact in its hands.'' These enforcement measures
break down into diplomatic, economic, and military categories.
In the past, individual nations were the primary users of diplo-
matic measures, which included negotiation, diplomatic protest,
and finally a rupture in diplomatic relations. °2 The United
Nations, however, has employed a variety of diplomatic measures
in cases where it disapproved of another nation's behavior, the
measure most commonly used being diplomatic censure. Despite
the United Nations' general approbation of diplomatic censure, this
measure will most likely be ineffective in cases of non-compliance
with the Court's interim orders. Diplomatic censure has effect only
insofar as a party gives weight to the United Nations' opinion. It"is
unlikely that a party will respond to mere verbal chastisement by
the United Nations when it has already defied the authority of the
highest international tribunal. In the Corfu Channel Case, the Brit-
ish attempted to go a step beyond diplomatic censure and actually
exclude Albania from the United Nations for its definance of the
Court's judgment.0 3 The propriety of these more extreme diplo-
matic measures, which result in exclusion or expulsion from inter-
national organizations, is questionable since such action inhibits
discussion between nations. t '
Economic measures break down into two general categories:
99. Supra note 15 and accompanying text.
100. The Security Council's ability to compel U.N. members to participate in U.N. sanc-
tions against non-complying nations gives the Security Council an advantage over individual
nations in the enforcement of the Court's orders. Under Article 25 any action taken by the
Security Council under Article 94(2) binds all U.N. members and supercedes any previous
international treaties or agreements.
101. Reisman, supra note 67, at 240.
102. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 27-
35 (1961).
103. 10 U.N. SCOR (703rd mtg.), 15 (1955).
104. See the advisory opinion in regard to Admissions [1947-48] I.C.J. 57. See also Reis-
man, supra note 67, at 856.
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"attachment or freezing of assets" and "the manipulation of trade
and foreign aid."' 5 The Council has authorized nations to freeze
or attach foreign assets under its general powers to preserve the
peace. 10 6 These measures are an appropriate means for enforcing
interim measures of protection because of their immediate impact.
However, as has previously been pointed out, in many cases involv-
ing interim orders, threats of monetary sanctions will not deter par-
ties from encroaching on each other's rights.
While freezing and attachment impose a direct economic hard-
ship, the manipulation of trade is a more indirect means of enforce-
ment. The British effectively employed this form of economic
coercion against the Soviets by conditioning a favorable trade
agreement upon the payment of Soviet compensation to the British
for expropriated property.0 7 Export boycotts also constitute trade
manipulation, yet experts generally agree that such measures have
little effect since they can be easily circumvented by means of
"transshipment."' 0 8 A final economic sanction is manipulation of
foreign aid to compel compliance. This measure is suspect on prac-
tical *and moral grounds. First, such action would apply only to
lesser developed countries who receive large quantities of aid. Sec-
ond, cutting off aid to nations who expect and depend upon this
help is morally offensive.' 0 9
In some respects, military enforcement is the most appropriate
measure as it can be invoked quickly and it effectively secures the
parties' rights. The fact that the Council can use military force only
in situations which threaten world peace severely limits the applica-
tion of this measure. .. In addition, such action can often escalate
into violent confrontations involving many nations. Consequently,
neither the Security Council nor individual nations will, in most
cases, be willing to take this risk of escalation. For example, in the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, international law appeared to
105. Reisman, supra note 67, at 852.
106. See the Council's resolutions S/RES/216 (1965) November 12, 1956; and S/RES/
217 (1965), November 20, 1965, calling for an economic boycott against Rhodesia.
107. Nussbaum, The Arbitration Between Lena Goldfields Lid and the Soviet Government,
36 CORNELL L. REV. 31 (1950).
108. Raj, Sanctions and the Indian Experience, in SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA
197, 201 (Segal, ed., 1964).
109. There is a trend in the U.S. foreign aid program to give the aid to international
agencies, such as the International Bank, who do take international policy into consideration
when doling out foreign aid. See Frank, Foreign Aidand the Liberal Dissent, 52 New Repub-
lic, January 23, 1965, at 17.
110. See, infra note 118 and accompanying text.
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support military intervention by Britain. However, fearful that the
Soviets would enter the conflict, the British Government refrained
from such action."'
2. Enforcement Devises Available Under Article 94(2). Some
commentators maintain the provisions in the Charter of the United
Nations severely limit the types of enforcement actions available
under Article 94(2) and restrict the situations in which those allow-
able enforcement techniques may be deployed. Again, Pavolsky's
interpretation, which requires a threat to world peace before any
action may be taken under Article 94(2), has considerable impact
on the kinds of enforcement available under Article 94(2). If the
Security Council's competence under Article 94(2) depends upon
its power under Article 39 of Chapter VII, then the Security Coun-
cil may be limited to those enforcement measures specifically au-
thorized in Articles 41 and 42 of Chapter VII." 2 The measures
under Article 41 include economic boycotts, interruption of com-
munications, and severance of diplomatic relations,' while Article
42 authorizes military action." 4 Some commentators argue that
the language of Article 41 does not limit the choice of measures to
those specified in the Article. They contend that the provision sim-
ply provides a list of suggested measures.l"
If the Security Council concludes it has independent compe-
tence under Article 94(2), then there is no reason for inferring that
action under that section is limited to those measures outlined in
11. Ford, supra note 51, at 58, 95.
112. Kelsen states:
[Tihe question arises whether the Council can take enforcement measures other
than those determined in Chapter VII of the Charter. Although an affirmative an-
swer to this question is not excluded by the wording of Article 94, paragraph 2, it is
more plausible to assume that a judgment of the Court can be enforced only by
measures taken under Article 41 or 42.
Supra note 95, at 941. Interestingly enough, Kelsen has adopted this position, yet disagrees
that the Council has competence under Article 94(2) only when there is a threat to the peace.
113. Article 41. The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the
use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call
upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may in-
dude complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air,
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communications, and the severances
of diplomatic relations.
114. Article 42. Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequte, it may take such
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and
other operations by air, sea or land forces of members of the United Nations.
115. The use of the word "may" in Article 41 strongly suggests that this provision is not
restrictive. See Reisman, supra note 67, at 719-20.
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Article 41.116 However, the question arises as to whether it may
implement those measures listed under Chapter VII when the situa-
tion at hand does not threaten the peace. It is plausible that the
drafters intended, by listing these measures, to prohibit their use
unless the situation met the prerequisites of Chapter VII. Com-
mentators, however, point to specific language in Article 41 of the
Charter, "to give effect to their decisions," and interpret this provi-
sion to mean the Council may invoke these measures to compel
compliance with any Security Council decision, not merely those
made under Chapter VII." 7 Most authorities recognize, however,
that the use of armed force under Article 94(2) requires a threat to
peace, even if the Security Council is deemed to have independent
competence." 8
D. Procedural Roadblocks in the U.N. to the Enforcement of
Interim Orders
The final obstacle facing enforcement of interim orders under
Article 94(2) is the veto provision in Article 27(3) enabling any per-
manent member to block enforcement measures. 19 Just as the veto
has greatly limited the impact of Article 39, it will cripple the Se-
curity Council's ability to act under Article 94(2) whenever the
non-complying party is a permanent member or has the support of
such a member. In attempting to circumvent a veto, nations bring-
ing a cause before the Security Council have asserted that the mat-
ter falls under the heading of procedure, and therefore should be
immune to a veto under Article 27(2). 120 Should the enforcement
of interim orders come under the definition of procedure, the veto
obstacle would be eliminated.
The FOUR SPONSORING POWERS at San Francisco es-
tablished a two-step process for determining whether a matter is
procedural.' 2 ' In the Charter, the drafters categorized certain
Council functions as either procedural or substantive. When the
Charter does not indicate a particular function, the FOUR SPON-
SORINGPOWERS stated that: "[Tihe decision regarding the pre-
liminary question as to whether or not such a matter is procedural,
must be taken by a vote of seven members of the Security Council,
116. Schachter, supra note 70, at 21.
117. Kelsen, supra note 95, at 541-42.
118. Id. at 542; Schachter, supra note 70, at 22.
119. Article 27(3).
120. Article 27(2).
121. Repertory, Vol. il, at 104.
Vol. I I
24
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 11, No. 3 [1981], Art. 13
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol11/iss3/13
INTERIM MEASURES STATUS
including the concurring votes of the permanent members.' 22 In
essence, the permanent members have a "double veto" power
which enables them to block any attempt to define a matter as pro-
cedural. The Charter does not specify whether Article 94(2) is pro-
cedural or substantive, and neither the Council nor the Interim
Committee assigned to study the problem of voting in the Council
has ruled on this issue.
123
Rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure provides an avenue for
avoiding the double veto through its provision that the Council's
President, with the support of any nine members, may rule that a
matter is procedural.124 Although Rule 30 provides a possible rem-
edy for dealing with a recalcitrant member who intends to prevent
the enforcement of I.C.J. decisions, it is a remedy which depends
upon the integrity and wisdom of the President. Should the office
be abused, Rule 30 would become a means of ramrodding matters
through the Council which should have been decided under the
traditional format.
The second sentence of Article 27(3) appears to provide an-
other means for curbing abusive vetoes by requiring that parties to
the dispute abstain from voting,' 25 the nemojudex rule. However,
most commentators agree that this provision does not apply to deci-
sions under Article 94(2). 126
E The Enforcement of Interim Orders by the General Assembly
and Other International Organizations
The debilitating effect of the veto power on the Security
Council has induced an aggressive assertion by the Assembly of
its power to enforce the Court's decisions. For example, in the
122. Id.
123. Report of the Interim Committee to the General Assembly (Jan. 5 - Aug. 5, 1948)
General Assembly, 3rd Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 10, at 3 and 14.
124. D. BOWETT, THE UNITED NATIONS 28 (1964).
125. Article 27.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an
affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent
members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of
Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.
126. Kelsen, supra note 95, at 241. Under the League of Nations, there was disagreement
as to the status of the nemotudex rule in regard to Article 13(4)-the League's equivalent to
94(2). RICHES, THE UNANIMITY RULE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1933). In reviewing
the validity of a P.C.I.J. judgment, the League Council applied the nemojudex rule, but in
the enforcement stage members could again exercise their veto. Finding that this practice
inhibited enforcement, the Council often attempted to circumvent the veto by effecting en-
forcement through a majority "proposal" which was not subject to a veto.
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International Status of South- West Africa Case, the Assembly made
recommendations under Article 10 for securing South Africa's
compliance with an advisory opinion by the Court.127 This affirma-
tive action by the Assembly differed markedly from the Security
Council's inaction in the Anglo-Iran Oil Company Case.128
Such enforcement measures clearly fall within the competence
of the Assembly as defined in Articles 10 and 14 which authorize
the Assembly to discuss and make recommendations on any matter
within the Charter.'29 The Soviets initially insisted on limiting the
Assembly's power of discussion to "any matter within the sphere of
international relations which affects the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security."' 13 However, under considerable pres-
sure from the United States and several other nations, the Soviets
agreed to a committee draft enabling the Council "to discuss and
make recommendations in respect of any matters within the sphere
of international relations."'' The only restriction on Article 10
and 14 occurs under Article 12(1) which prohibits the Assembly
from discussing matters before the Security Council.
32
127. [1950], I.C.J. 128.
128. The hesitation of the Security Council in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case
thus stands in marked contrast with the care of the General Assembly in its treat-
ment of the problem of South-West Africa to support and uphold the authority of
the Court. This anxiety of the General Assembly is not an isolated example, but is
part of a clearly defined general tendency, at least in so far as it is concerned with
the judicial activities of the Court ...
S. RoSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 113 (1977).
129. Article 10 states:
The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the
scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs
provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may
make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security
Council or to both on any such questions or matters.
Article 14 states:
Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend
measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it
deems likely to impair the general welfare of friendly relations among nations, in-
cluding situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter
setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
Both articles convey essentially the same power to the General Assembly. In fact, it is
virtually impossible to determine which article the Assembly acted under. In cases where the
General Assembly has made recommendations, generally Article 10 is viewed as having a
broader scope than Article 14. Rosenne, supra note 128, at 114 & 141-42. See L. GOODRICH,
E. HAMIRO AND SIMMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS Il (3d ed. 1969).
130. U.N.C.I.O., Documents, IX, 60.
131. Id See generally Goodrich, supra note 129, at 112.
132. Article 12(l) reads: "While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dis-
pute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly
shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Secur-
ity Council so requests."
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This power of the Assembly to recommend enforcement meas-
ures is severely hampered by the non-binding nature of these rec-
ommendations.'33 Members may simply disregard the measures
proposed by the Assembly under Articles 10 and 14. Despite their
non-binding nature, these recommendations still have considerable
impact in that they "bring to bear pressure of political and moral
character" on the non-complying state. 134 Furthermore, such ac-
tion by the Assembly puts considerable pressure on the Security
Council to take measures under Article 94(2) which do bind United
Nations members.
As Rosenne points out, enforcement need not come solely
from an organ of the United Nations. 35 Other international and
regional organizations provide in their Charters for enforcement of
judgments of the ICJ and other international tribunals.136 Enforce-
ment of interim orders of protection by these organizations face
many of the same obstacles which prevent effective enforcement
under 94(2) by the Security Council. In the first place, many of the
charters refer to the enforcement of final decisions without mention
of interim orders. 137 Similarly, these organizations lack effective
sanctions for compelling compliance. For many, their sole remedy
is either to expel the non-complying party or to cut off the services
provided by the organization. Often, such action has little coercive
effect and tends to undermine the organization by damaging its in-
ternal cohesiveness.
IV. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, the Iranian-Hostage case has not resolved the
questions as to the binding nature of interim orders and their en-
forceability under Article 94(2) of the United Nations Charter. Al-
though the United States actively sought an interim order from the
Court, it did not request a ruling from the Court as to the order's
legal effect, nor did the United States attempt to have the order
enforced through the Security Council under Article 94(2).
Despite the absence of a resolution of the legal issues concern-
ing interim orders, the Iranian-Hostage case has had an impact on
133. Nantwi, supra note 3, at 162.
134. Schachter, supra note 70, at 24.
135. S. ROSENNE, THE LAW AND INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE 155 (Vol. 1 (1969)).
136. For a thorough discussion of enforcement by international organizations, see
Nantwi, supra note 3, at 162-75.
137. Id.
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the international community's perception of interim orders and the
Court itself. The failure of the Security Council and members of
the United Nations to support actively the interim order has ren-
dered this legal remedy meaningless in the eyes of some nations.
This defacto reduction of the Court's power has cast doubt on its
ability to provide any relief in such crises.
Regardless of the negative effect which the Iranian-Hostage
case has had on interim orders, the case may have served to bolster
this interlocutory remedy and the Court's prestige in general. The
United States' request for an interim order displayed a respect for
the Court as a legal body and as a shaper of world opinion. This
request reinforced the Court's position as the supreme adjudicator
of international disputes. Perhaps, the United States' conduct will
encourage other nations involved in international disputes to seek
out interim relief, despite the inherent enforcement problems.
The Iranian Hostage case did little to resolve the uncertainty
surrounding interim orders. However, the crisis has served to bring
this interlocutory remedy to the attention of the world, and, as a
result of this publicity, it will most likely be sought with greater
frequency. Increased use of these measures will compel the Court
and the Security Council to deal with the difficult questions as to
the legal effect of interim orders and their enforcement.
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